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Sovereign Immunity From Jurisdiction:
French Caselaw Revisited
In 1977, French caselaw on sovereign immunity from jurisdiction was
described in this journal.1 At that time the situation could be summarized by
three propositions:
1. The registration (exequatur) of a judgment or an arbitral award against a State
did not raise the issue of sovereign immunity from execution. Such recognition
of a judicial or arbitral decision does not in itself constitute interference with
the property of a State, and is therefore a corollary to the assertion of jurisdic-
tion; if there was no immunity from jurisdiction, registration of the decision
that resulted from the assertion of jurisdiction may not be resisted on the
grounds of immunity.
2
2. The absence of immunity from jurisdiction did not automatically remove
immunity from execution.
3
3. Immunity from execution does not apply to a State's commercial property.
The first two propositions remain valid today and do not appear to have
been questioned since 1977. On the other hand, there have been significant
developments with respect to the third proposition, and in the case of
Eurodif v. Iran, decided on 14 March 1984, 4 the highest French court (the
Cour de cassation) redefined the rules that limit sovereign immunity from
execution. The following is intended to update the earlier article and clarify
the meaning and potential impact of this decision.
*The author practices law in Paris.
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In the first case that appeared to limit sovereign immunity from
execution, 5 involving an attachment of funds held by a French bank in the
name of the Norwegian government, an analysis of the facts demonstrated
that the funds belonged to a national whose assets were being protected
from the World War II occupation forces, so the case may seem to have less
to do with sovereign immunity than with the question whether the property
was in fact that of the Norwegian state.
Some two decades later, in the leading Englander case, 6 it was held that a
French plaintiff could execute a French money judgment against the State
Bank of Czechoslovakia by seizing its account at the Banque commerciale
pour l'Europe du Nord. The Court of Appeal had ruled that sovereign
immunity was a bar to such execution, because the accounts of the State
Bank had served variously to pay the debts of commercial entities belonging
to the Czech state and the costs of the state's participation in various
international organizations. The highest court reversed, holding that the
"mere chance" that it might be impossible to separate private-use from
public-use funds was not sufficient to sustain a finding of immunity, since it
had been determined that only a part of the funds belonged to the Czech
state. Somewhat like the case involving the Norwegian government, the
Englander case was not fully satisfactory as a precedent: it did not face the
issue of the limits of immunity if the property was clearly that of the state.
B. 1977-1984
Such a case, Dame Clerget v. People's Republic of Vietnam Trade Mission,
et al., was decided in 1977. 7 The defendant was the People's Republic of
Vietnam, and the plaintiff a judgment creditor. The latter attempted to levy
execution on funds held by the Banque commerciale pour les pays de
l'Europe du Nord, but his action was denied by the courts. Confirming the
Court of Appeal of Paris, the Cour de cassation approved the holding that
the funds of a foreign sovereign were immune as long as their origin and
intended use had not been determined. This would not preclude a plaintiff
from arguing that their origin and intended use was such that immunity
should be denied. One assumed that, consonant with developments in other
5. Procureur G6n6ral v. Vestig, decision of 5 February 1946, Cour de cassation, 1947 SIREY
(1) 1937; 1946-1949 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1.
6. Englander v. State Bank of Czechoslovakia, decision of 11 February, 1969, Cour de
cassation, 1970 REV.CRIT. 101; 1969 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 923.
7. Decision of 2 November 1971, Cour de cassation, 1972 REV.CRIT. 312.
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countries, the crucial distinction would be between property used for
sovereign functions and property used in commerce. If this was the rule as of
1977, however, it had to be understood by inference, because there had
been no case holding that property belonging to a state was in fact subject to
execution.
The Cour de cassation had had only one occasion to pronounce itself in
this area during the period between 1977 and 1984, and that was in the
so-called CA VNOS case, 8 named for an Algerian pension fund which had
taken over the assets of a private pension fund established prior to inde-
pendence. The national fund of the French bar association, subrogated
to the rights of French contributors to the pre-independence fund, sued
CAVNOS and attached its assets in France. CAVNOS attempted to have
the attachments set aside on the grounds that it was a public-service entity
and therefore immune from execution. This argument was rejected by the
French court, which held that since CAVNOS' funds were distinct from
those of the State of Algeria, there was no immunity.
The CAVNOS decision is, therefore, reminiscent of the Englander case in
which the Cour de cassation appeared to apply the presumption that assets
of legal entities in the public sector but distinct from the State, and not
exclusively engaged in public functions, are not immune from execution.9 It
8. Caisse algdrienne d'assurance vieillesse des non-salarids (CAVNOS) v. Caisse nationale
des barreaux franqais, decision of 7 December 1977, Cour de cassation, 1978 REV.CRIT. 532.
9. Other French decisons have, like the CAVNOS case, dealt with the issue whether a
formally independent public sector entity is entitled to sovereign immunity. In Zavicha Bla-
gojevic v. Bank of Japan, decision of 19 May 1976, Cour de cassation, 1977 REv.CRIT. 359, a
plaintiff failed to convince the courts that the Bank of Japan had acted outside the scope of its
delegated powers in applying Japanese exchange controls. (The claim alleged that the Bank of
Japan's actions did not have bonafide exchange control purposes, but were intended to help a
private Japanese company escape contractual obligations.) Accordingly, immunity of jurisdic-
tion barred the action. For a case where the public sector entity was not acting "in the name and
on the account of the State," see Air Zaire v. Gauthier et al., decision of 31 January 1984, Court
of Appeal of Paris, 1984 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY (12 April) 160, in which a conservatory
attachment of aircraft was upheld against a claim of sovereign immunity of execution. The court
held that no immunity may be invoked with respect to "purely commercial operations." In this
case, the underlying action was brought by a group of Belgian pilots who claimed to have been
wrongfully dismissed from their employment by Air Zaire.
The issue of immunity of execution as invoked by public sector entities is an intriguing one;
the question appears to be whether they have acted within the scope of delegation of sovereign
powers. If they have not acted in the name of the puissance publique, there is no sovereign
immunity. It is, however, for this very reason that such cases make but a limited contribution to
our understanding of sovereign immunity. For if the burden on a formally independent
parastatal entity is to prove that it is in fact acting for the state, and the private party therefore
can content itself to contest the existence of such a delegation, the question remains very much
open as to how one goes about determining that a state itself has acted outside the realm of its
sovereign functions.
The fascinating and hugely important matter of determining whether, and if so to what
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did not, however, answer the main issue: whether and, if so, in what
circumstances the property of a state itself might be subject to forcible
measures. Although this issue did arise in two subsequent highly visible
litigations, the cases were settled before they reached the Court of Appeals,
let alone the Cour de Cassation.
The first case, Ipitrade, involving attachments of bank accounts of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria on the strength of an International Chamber of
Commerce arbitral award rendered in Geneva, was decided by the Vice-
President of the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris10 in favor of the
claimants on the grounds that a post-arbitral settlement agreement between
the parties contained an unequivocal waiver of immunity from execution.
Shortly thereafter, the dispute was definitively resolved by negotiation.I1
The Ipitrade case thus stands for the proposition that an express waiver of
sovereign immunity from execution is effective, and on the assumption that
this view would not be disavowed by higher courts-and there is no sugges-
tion to the contrary in scholarly commentary-one would conclude that
French law on this point is consistent with international practice.12 But it
does not resolve the issue with respect to the more common situation where
there is no such waiver. Although the nearly simultaneous LIAMCO case
did not involve a waiver, it is unsatisfactory as a precedent for other reasons.
A subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company, LIAMCO had won an
arbitral award (rendered in Geneva by a sole arbitrator appointed by the
President of the International Court of Justice) in the amount of U.S. $80
million. To enforce the award, LIAMCO attached assets located in France
held in the name of the Libyan Arab Republic and a number of Libyan state
entities. These attachments were vacated by the Tribunal de grande intance
of Paris, on the ground that immunity applied since
no distinction can be made at this time between funds allocated to sovereign or
public-service activity and those derived from economic or commercial activities
governed by private law.13
extent, execution may be sought against the assets of parastatal entities in order to satisfy claims
against the state itself is beyond the scope of this article. See generally the casenote of Professor
Pierre Mayer under Crddit populaire d'Alg~rie v. SAPVIN, decision of 14 February 1978, Cour
de cassation, 1980 REV.CRIT. 707.
10. Procureur de la Rdpublique v. S.A. Ipitrade International, decision of 12 September
1978, Tribunal de grande instance of Paris (r6f~rd), 1979 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL
857.
11. The settlement also terminated litigation in the U.S.; see Ipitrade International v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F.Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978).
12. See generally G. Delaume, State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 AM. J. INT.
L. 784 (1981).
13. Procureur de la R~publique v. LIAMCO, decision of 5 March 1979, Trib. gr. inst. of
Paris (r~frd), 1979 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 859, at 861.
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However, the court simultaneously ordered an investigation into the nature,
destination, and use of the assets of the Libyan state entities. 14 This order
implies that enforcement might have been available against such assets,
provided they were "derived from economic or commercial activities gov-
erned by private law." It is unclear whether it was envisaged that enforce-
ment against assets not owned directly by the state might be justified by
disregarding the State emanation's corporate veil, or perhaps by considering
that assets held in the name of such an entity was for the account of the state.
A further element of ambiguity was the fact that no investigation was
ordered with respect to assets directly owned by the state. Be that as it may,
a negotiated settlement between the parties ended the litigation and made it
unnecessary for the French courts to deal with such findings as the experts
commissioned by the Tribunal de grande instance might have made.1 5
In the light of the Englander-Clerget-CA VNOS line of cases, as colored by
the lower court's decision in LIAMCO,1 6 a commentator concluded:
French law allows the attachment of assets of separate state instrumentalities
unless these assets are themselves set aside for immune purposes or can be shown
to be inextricably mixed with assets that are. In the case of state funds, it is still
uncertain whether execution will ever be permitted: though the weight of doctrine
favors the possibility, the jurisprudence is by no means so clear. At any rate,
attachment will only be possible against assets or a separate fund shown to be
clearly devoted to non-immune purposes.1 7
This was an appropriate assessment of the state of French law prior to the
landmark decision of Eurodif v. Iran; however, with that decision the entire
landscape of this legal area has been altered.
14. The terms of reference for this investigation, to be carried out by three court-appointed
experts, were nearly identical to those designed for the earlier Braden Copper Company case
described in Paulsson, supra Note 2, at 677-9.
15. As in the Ipitrade case, the litigation was not limited to France; LIAMCO had sought
enforcement in the U.S., Sweden, and Switzerland as well. For a summary of these actions, see
20 I.L.M. 891 (1981).
16. There was yet a third post-CA VNOS case involving an attempt to enforce an arbitration
award against a state itself. An Italian claimant, Benvenuti & Bonfant, had won an ICSID
arbitration against the People's Republic of Congo and sought to have it enforced in France.
While the President of the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris granted recognition of the
award, he qualified his order by stating that the award creditor must come back to him for
authorization prior to seeking any specific enforcement against Congolese assets. Benvenuti &
Bonfant seized the Paris Court of Appeal, which struck down this qualification by noting that
the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, pursuant to which ICSID was created, requires France to recognize and enforce
ICSID awards as if they were a final French court judgment, and that the qualification devised
by the lower court magistrate was not one that would attach to an French court judgment;
decision of 26 June 1981, 1981 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 843; English translation in 20
I.L.M. 878 (1981). This case thus does not reach our topic. Had Benvenuti & Bonfant been
obliged to advance to the execution stage, this might have been the case, but once again the
litigation ceased upon payment by Congo; see I NEWS FROM ICSID 2 (1984).
17. Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 75 AM. J. INT. L.
820, at 843 (1981).
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II. Eurodif v. Iran
The case arose out of the Iranian withdrawal from the Eurodif nuclear
fuel enrichment project for the construction of a large plant at Tricastin in
the south of France. Eurodif was created in 1973 as a joint venture with four
European countries as participants. The lead participant was the French
Commissariat d l'Energie Atomique (CEA). In late 1974, Iran negotiated a
10 percent participation in the project, thereby assuring itself access to a
high-technology enrichment process, which the then Iranian government
desired as an element of its ambitious nuclear-industry program.
Following the revolution that created the Islamic Republic of Iran, that
country's nuclear program was abandoned by governmental decision; Iran
ceased payments to Eurodif and repudiated its undertaking to take or pay
for its share of Eurodif's output. A capital-intensive venture, Eurodif con-
sidered its shareholders' purchase agreements to be a cornerstone of its
financial structure and essential to the servicing of its debt.' 8
Eurodif along with Sofidif, a French company established to channel the
Iranian participation in Eurodif, as well as CEA, accordingly commenced
International Chamber of Commerce arbitration proceedings against Iran
as stipulated in the contract. Furthermore, pending the arbitration, Eurodif
and Sofidif sought and obtained a conservatory attachment from the Tribun-
al of Commerce of Paris as security for its claim, which was provisionally
evaluated in the amount of 9 billion French francs. The attachment order
authorized Eurodif and Sofidif to seize a debt owed by CEA (and second-
arily by the French state as guarantor) under a U.S. $1 billion loan granted
by the State of Iran in 1975 as part of the overall accords of cooperation in
the nuclear area.
Iran appealed, and obtained a favorable decision on 21 April 1982 from
the Court of Appeal of Paris,' 9 which held that Iran was entitled to
sovereign immunity of execution. It noted that the attached debt was owed
to the Iranian state whose future use of monies repaid as principal and
interest was not subject to any restriction, and therefore the Iranian govern-
ment would be in a position to exercise its sovereign discretion as to the
allocation of these funds to whatever government activities it chose. Under
these circumstances, the Court held, immunity applied.
The Cour de cassation reversed in a brief decision which begins by
articulating the following basic proposition:
18. A detailed description of the contractual framework of the dispute appears in the brief to
the Cour de cassation of M. l'Avocat General Gulphe, 1984 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (23 May)
20205.
19. 1983 REV. CRIT. 101; 1983 JOURNAL Du DROrT INTERNATIONAL 145; 1982 LA REVUE
D'ARBITRAGE 209.
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Whereas a foreign State in principle benefits from immunity of execution; but
whereas this immunity may exceptionally be ruled out; whereas this is the case
whenever the seized asset has been allocated to economic or commercial activity
governed by private law and which gave rise to the legal action. 20
Having announced this as being the general rule, and characteristically
omitting any mention that it was in fact creating a new rule, the Cour de
cassation reviewed the general framework of the litigation and the Court of
Appeal's decision to accord immunity on the sole basis that the attached
assets were "public funds." It noted that the Court of Appeal had deemed it
irrelevant to determine "whether the activities of production and distribu-
tion of enriched uranium in which the Iranian State had undertaken to
participate were of a commercial character that subject them purely to
private law," and concluded, in light of the statement of principle quoted
above, that:
. . . in so holding, even though its decision makes clear that the attached claim was
one held by the State of Iran against CEA and the French State under the loan
agreement of 23 February 1975, and it thus followed that the origins of said claim
were the same funds that had been allocated to the accomplishment of the
Franco-Iranian program of production and distribution of nuclear energy, the
rupture of which by the Iranian party had given rise to the action, the Court of
Appeal, on which it was thus incumbent to determine the nature of this activity in
order to decide the issue of immunity of execution, had not given a legal basis for
its decision. 21
The Cour de cassation thus overruled the Court of Appeal of Paris and, in
conformity with French practice, referred the case to the Court of Appeal of
Versailles, to which Iran would have to turn to pursue its challenge of the
attachment. (The decision of the Paris Court of Appeal having been re-
versed, the original attachment order of the Tribunal of Commerce of Paris
was reinstated.)
III. The Consequences
One now knows that if assets of a state have been used for or allocated to
the same economic or commercial activities that gave rise to the claim, they
are not immune from execution. The only restriction on this rule would
seem to be that the transactions must be such that they are of a "private law"
character. In practice, much depends on whether French courts in the future
interpret the notion of "private law" activities broadly or restrictively. One
might reasonably expect that with regard to activities carried out in pur-
suance of international contracts, French courts would tend to view them as
having a private law character whether or not they would have been consid-




ered administrative contracts as a matter of French domestic law if they had
been concluded between the French state and one of its nationals.22 With
one blow, French jurisprudence may thus be said to have unambiguously
aligned itself with the generally restrictive approach to sovereign immunity
of execution reflected in U.S. and U.K. legislation, as well as in the Euro-
pean Convention on State Immunity of 1972 (which France has not
ratified) .23
The Eurodif v. Iran case leaves open the question of the conditions, if any,
under which a private claimant may obtain execution against a state's assets
even though they were not used in connection with the transaction that gave
rise to the claim, by showing that those assets have their origin in activities of
a private law character. Would the claimant in this situation be required to
make the difficult demonstration that the assets were also intended in the
future to be used in activities of a private law character? To draw such a
conclusion now would doubtless be hasty. One notes that the Avocat Gn-
ral's brief before the Cour de cassation-which to some extent may be
considered to reflect an official view, if not directly that of the Ministry of
Justice-had criticized the Court of Appeal for having based its decision
only on the destination of the funds, without taking into account their
origin.24 The Cour de cassation, whose weighing of words is legendary, was
careful not to say that cases where state assets are allocated to the activity
underlying the claim constitute the only exceptions to sovereign immunity of
execution.
One might, for example, consider that any state asset allocated to non-
sovereign use may be subject to execution irrespective of its connection with
the claim, and that with respect to sums of money, the fact that they
originated in a commercial transaction would give rise to a presumption that
their destination would also be non-sovereign. 25 It will surely be argued that
there is no justification in principle for the result that a claimant who
happens to find a state asset in France that is connected with the activities
out of which the claim arose achieve complete success, while an equally
deserving claimant fail completely because the assets, although used for
22. Professor Herv6 Synvet, in the first French academic commentary on the Eurodifc. Iran
case, expressed the view that in reproaching the Court of Appeal of Paris for not having
determined whether the activity in the context of which the attached loan arose was of a
commercial nature, the Cour de cassation "in truth implies a preference for a positive answer."
M. Synvet lists the following elements as militating against the conclusion that a contract is
concluded in the exercise of sovereign functions: contractual form modeled on typical instru-
ments used in international trade, contractual stipulation of a national applicable law, absence
of clauses that are exorbitantes du droit commun (i.e. containing provisions that two private
parties could not legally agree), and reference to commercial arbitration in the event of dis-
pute. Id.
23. Of May 16, 1972, EUROP. T. S. No. 74.
24. 1984 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (23 May) 20205.
25. Prof. Synvet suggests this analysis, supra note 22.
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non-sovereign activities, do not have such a connection. Of course, difficul-
ties remain. For example, it remains to be confirmed that French courts
would consider that funds have a commercial "origin" because their last use
was in a commercial transaction, rather than allowing a defendant state to
invoke immunity by pointing to an earlier public source (ultimately leading
to the general revenues of the state, which might be expected to be domi-
nated by income from taxes and other levies). Nevertheless, it will doubtless
not be long before private claimants seek to avail themselves of the openings
suggested by the Eurodif v. Iran holding.
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